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Abstract  
 
This article considers how permissive regulatory conditions helped change the size and scope 
of the US mortgage market. Asset backed securitization facilitated an expansion of the US 
mortgage market and modified the structure of the value chain within which financial assets, 
risk and liquidity were managed. New sophisticated mortgage products, indulgent lending 
practices, loose credit assessment and flimsy documentation increased the probability of 
mortgage default in an economic downturn. US banks were not in a position to absorb mark 
to market losses on mortgage assets and goodwill impairment resulting from a credit crunch 
because they operate with narrow profit margins and a limited equity cushion in the balance 
sheet. This article questions the viability and sustainability of this banking business model. 
 
Keywords: US credit crisis, mortgage securitization, financial value chain, risk and 
liquidity. 
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“We remain conscious that since substantial risk still remains on our balance sheet, these 
factors will likely affect our business for the remainder of the year or longer.”  
 
J.P. Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon July 17th 2008 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The current “credit crunch” emerged as a serious problem for the US economy towards the 
end of 2006 when charge off’s and default rates on sub-prime higher risk loans increased. A 
growing number of US households either could not repay existing mortgage debt (charged 
off) or defaulted (repayment schedules not met). The financial risk attached to sub-prime 
mortgages was less of a problem when US home prices inflated and household’s could not 
only trade up but also extract additional cash resources from equity release schemes. Charge 
offs and the rate of mortgage loan delinquency increased towards the end of year 2006 and 
this upward trend continued into 2008. Charge offs are written off at fair value against bank 
balance sheet assets seriously undermining banking sector net income, market valuation, 
shareholder equity, and capital market liquidity.   
 
Asset backed securitization permitted the banking sector to issue mortgages ahead of 
deposits, such that the value of outstanding mortgages in the US at the end of 2007 exceeded 
annual national income. As US house prices fall mortgage charge off and default rates 
increased forcing mark to market write offs of irrecoverable mortgages and the fire sale of 
collateral through 2007 and into 2008. The initial increase in mortgage charges offs 
threatened the financial stability of the banking sector in the US with follow on consequences 
for capital market liquidity. US banks became reluctant to lend to each other as they 
defensively restructured balance sheets holding on to cash as a liquidity hedge.  
 
Mortgage backed securitization provided US banks with a way to extend their lending 
capacity whilst also containing balance sheet risk associated with this process. Banking 
executives paid substantial financial incentives to grow the product market with new product 
such as variable rate “pick and pay” mortgages all of which served to extend the value of 
balance sheet securitized mortgages. US households were actively encouraged to finance 
current expenditure from mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW). Economists differentiate 
between wealth and income whereby house price inflation is simply accumulated wealth on 
paper. Yet mortgage equity withdrawal is about leveraging additional cash from the 
difference between the current market value of real estate and current mortgage debt 
outstanding. In turn, this additional source of household income finds its way into current 
income and expenditure circuits that make up annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
 
The value of US household mortgages outstanding at the end of 2007 was roughly $11 
trillion and it only needed a relatively small increase in the default rate for this to have a 
significant negative impact on the banking sector net income and condition of balance sheets. 
Mortgage charge off’s are no longer restricted to sub-prime mortgages and Jamie Dimon’s 
quote is significant because the problem of mortgage charge off and delinquency has spread 
beyond sub-prime and into so-called Alt A rated loans.   
 
In 2007, estimates suggested that $2 trillion out of the $11 trillion of outstanding mortgages 
were sub-prime in 2007. The exact definition of "subprime" itself is not clear, with various 
sources estimating that the total subprime portfolio of the US is between $1.5 trillion to $3 
trillion.  
http://goldnews.bullionvault.com/subprime_sub_prime_gold_dollar_bernanke_111420073 
 
For the year end 2008 loan charge offs and delinquency rates on loans secured by real estate 
stood at roughly 10 per cent of all real estate mortgages outstanding compared to 1.5% in 
mid-2006. If we assume that mortgages currently delinquent were also to be subsequently 
charged off this would result in a cumulative write down approaching $1 trillion and 
equivalent to writing off all shareholder equity in main US banks at December 2008. 
 
In the US financialized economy a combination of regulatory permissiveness driven on by 
managerial incentives and household demand for credit forced outstanding mortgages ahead 
of GDP. Domestic real estate prices are down 27% December 2008 compared to June 2006 
(S&P-Case Shiller Index) in the US. The ABX index that tracks the value of sub-prime credit 
swaps reinforcing evidence of substantial negative mark to market adjustments both in the 
sub-prime market and to a lesser extent in AAA rated mortgage portfolios as US house 
prices, for high and low income households, are marked down.  
 
This article has three sections. The first section of this article we review the literature on 
financialization as it applies to the development of the US economy. The literature on 
financialization explores the tension between financial and productive logic(s) governing the 
management of the economy, social settlements and governance. Our second section reviews 
how modifications to the legal and accounting regulations governing the banking value chain 
encouraged fragmentation and out-sourcing connected with the process of mortgage 
securitization. Our final section considers the implications of managing a financialized 
banking sector. Where, the scale of financial assets under management combines with mark 
to market accounting to amplify instability especially when US banks operate with a fragile 
financial operating architecture. Net income and shareholder equity offer a limited cushion 
against mark to market write down(s) and this fragility calls into question the viability and 
sustainability of the US banking business model.   
     
2.  Mortgaging US households 
 
We employ the descriptor ‘financialization’ as a way of ‘making sense out of what is going 
on around us’ (Martin, 2002). The term ‘financialization’ has been employed to reveal, how: 
managerial behaviour and culture, corporate governance, stakeholder interests, firm 
performance, structural economic adjustment, national economic competitiveness and the 
distribution of income and wealth that are modified by the demands of finance capital (Deeg 
et al 2006; Fligstein 2004; Froud et al, 2006; Kripner, 2005, Rossman et al, 2006; 
Stockhammer, 2004). Financialization describes a process of economic change in which the 
structure of advanced economies has shifted increasingly towards the provision of financial 
services and where the value of financial assets exceeds that of tangible assets. Foster (2007) 
notes that: 
 
“Although orthodox economists have long assumed that productive investment and 
financial investment are tied together—working on the simplistic assumption that the 
saver purchases a financial claim to real assets from the entrepreneur who then uses 
the money thus acquired to expand production—this has long been known to be false. 
There is no necessary direct connection between productive investment and the 
amassing of financial assets. It is thus possible for the two to be “decoupled” to a 
considerable degree”  
(Foster 2007 http://marxsite.com/Finance_Capital.html) 
 
Foster provides a way of thinking about the process of financialization as one in which there 
is a decoupling of financial from productive tangible asset investment. Our supplementary 
argument is that financialization is not simply a process of decoupling wealth accumulation 
from current income circuits as described by Foster. It is also concerned with how the gains 
(and losses) from wealth accumulation (capital stock) interfere with current income circuits 
(flows) within national economies and the consequences of this for economic development 
and financial stability of firms.   
 
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) generally follows the trend of GDP in the US and 
specifically the stock of residential domestic real estate formation followed the general trend 
of GDP growth 1963 to 2007. For the period 1963 – 2005, the value of new residential 
housing GFCF tracked GDP apart from a step reduction in the early 1990s. The index of real 
estate GFCF reveals how fixed asset capital formation tracks GDP but this is not the same 
thing as financing the purchase of real estate and specifically the growth in household 
mortgages outstanding. 
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Source: http://www.bea.gov/ 
 In contrast, the pattern of outstanding mortgages held by US households follows a different 
trajectory over the period 1963 to 2007. For the first twenty years (1963-1983) the nominal 
value of outstanding household mortgages and GDP move in line with each at a compound 
average growth rate (CAGR) of 9%. Thereafter the two trajectories diverge. The value of the 
stock of outstanding real estate mortgages continues at its earlier CAGR of 9% but nominal 
GDP growth slows to a CAGR of 5.3% 1983 to 2007.  
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Sources: Mortgage data http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/ 
GDP data: http://www.bea.gov/ 
 
The decoupling of the value of mortgages outstanding from GDP growth is explained by the 
compounding effect of house price inflation coupled with the growth in the physical stock of 
residential houses in the US from 60 million in 1963 to 120 million in 2007. To which it is 
also necessary to add “home equity release mortgages” which had increased to $1.1 trillion as 
at the end of 2007 or 9% of the value of outstanding mortgages in 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: US GDP and household mortgages outstanding in 2007 ($trillion) 
 2007 $ trillion 
US GDP 13.8 
Outstanding home mortgages 12.0 
Of which equity mortgages 1.1 
Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/ 
 
Many US households have been actively leveraging their borrowing from what are termed 
“home equity lines of credit” and this has further increased the value of outstanding mortgage 
debt. 
The Federal Reserve Board provides the following advice. 
More and more lenders are offering home equity lines of credit. By using the equity in 
your home, you may qualify for a sizable amount of credit, available for use when and 
how you please, at an interest rate that is relatively low. Furthermore, under the tax 
law--depending on your specific situation--you may be allowed to deduct the interest 
because the debt is secured by your home”. 
A home equity line of credit is a form of revolving credit in which your home serves 
as collateral. Because the home is likely to be a consumer's largest asset, many 
homeowners use their credit lines only for major items such as education, home 
improvements, or medical bills and not for day-to-day expenses. 
Once approved for a home equity line of credit, you will most likely be able to borrow 
up to your credit limit whenever you want. Typically, you will use special checks to 
draw on your line. Under some plans, borrowers can use a credit card or other means 
to draw on the line.  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/HomeLine/ 
The following example demonstrates the financial calculations involved. 
Appraised value of home $100,000 
Percentage         x 75% 
Percentage of appraised value = $ 75,000 
Less balance owed on mortgage                     $ 40,000 
Potential line of credit        $ 35,000 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/HomeLine/default.htm#equity 
The value of potential line of credit is three-quarters of the appraised value of a home minus 
the value of mortgages owed and US households have been actively leveraging their 
borrowing exploiting “home equity lines of credit”. At the end of 2007, the value of 
accumulated equity release secured against real estate had increased to 9 per cent of 
outstanding mortgage debt in 2007 or $1.1 trillion. 
Table 2: US Home and equity release mortgages outstanding 1990 to 2007 
    Home mortgages Equity Mortgages Equity Share in total 
 $ bill $ bill % 
1990 2911.6 214.7 7.4 
1991 3075.1 222 7.2 
1992 3227.7 217.1 6.7 
1993 3384 210.4 6.2 
1994 3562.6 221.8 6.2 
1995 3736.1 237.5 6.4 
1996 3972.3 262.6 6.6 
1997 4218.9 297 7.0 
1998 4609.3 309.9 6.7 
1999 5076.5 334.3 6.6 
2000 5533.7 407.9 7.4 
2001 6127.4 438.9 7.2 
2002 6924.6 500.7 7.2 
2003 7795.4 592.8 7.6 
2004 8891.3 773.3 8.7 
2005 10067.1 911.6 9.1 
2006 11192.9 1060.8 9.5 
2007 11995.5 1125 9.4 
 
Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a2005-2007.pdf  
Note: Data for this table from Table L218 see also memo item in table 
 
The growth in outstanding household mortgages, relative to GDP growth, in the US reflects 
the combined effects of: increased demand for housing, compound price inflation and equity 
release mortgages. The value of US household mortgages outstanding has, since the early 
1980s, run ahead of GDP growth (see Chart 2). From a position where outstanding home 
mortgages were equivalent to one-third (in 1963) then one-half (in 1990) of GDP they are 
now roughly equivalent to US annual GDP. The break between GDP and value of mortgages 
outstanding coincides with changes in banking regulation and accounting practices in the mid 
1980s The composition of the mortgage market changed from a system based on deposits to 
one of securitized assets. Until the early 1980’s the majority of the US mortgage market was 
structured by deposits (70%) but by 2005 this picture had reversed with securitized assets 
accounting for 60% of the market. 
 
Chart 3:  Mortgage Market Structure (percent composition in the US) 
   
Source: Schnure 2005, figure 2 
The Savings and Loan crisis in the 1980´s changed the system for US housing finance from 
local and regional balance sheet lending by depositories to a national market based system of 
securities mortgage finance (Schnure 2005). Securitization of assets involves repackaging 
and selling off balance sheet assets such as mortgages into a secondary market. Mortgage 
backed securitization allowed banks to modify their balance sheet risk exposure (and cost of 
capital) and significantly raise additional cash resources for lending to households. 
Securitization provided banks with the financial capability to increase the supply of mortgage 
funds to an increasing number of home owning households paying more for their properties. 
Chart 3 reveals the changing financial structure of the mortgage market. Initially bank 
deposits accounted for approximately 70 per cent of the total mortgage market but by the mid 
to late 1980s securitized mortgages take an increased share of total mortgage finance 
reaching 65 % by 2005. 
Recent US house price appreciation also helped to enlarge the size and scope of secondary 
markets for securities backed by non-prime mortgage loans at a time when the system of US 
housing finance changed profoundly (Frankel 2006). A point also observed by Greenspan 
(2005): 
 
“… over the past two decades, major innovations in the United States have improved 
the availability and lowered costs of home mortgages.  These developments likely 
spurred home owners to increasing home equity to finance consumer expenditure 
beyond home purchase” 
 
The sharp rise in US home prices also coincides with a competitive pressure on lenders to 
develop non-traditional loan products, such as Adjustable-Rate Mortgages (ARM), and the 
Pick a Payment loan(s) where non-agency mortgage underwriters took an increasing share of 
US housing finance and especially that for sub-prime borrowers. Another development in the 
mortgage market was the emergence of intermediary brokers and use of technology for rapid 
decisions, for example, automated underwriting systems with credit history scoring for 
pricing of mortgages and default risks.  The system of US mortgage finance is thus an 
outcome of regulatory reform and market based responses that fragment the financial value 
chain into specialist roles, each with its own business interest and objectives, which 
complicates responsibility and solutions (FRB 2007, Frankel 2006, Krinsman 2007) 
 
Changes in the mortgage product market and investment in non-agency securities now 
involves banks in exposure to both prepayment and default risk (as a result of credit risk 
exposure) in addition to the more traditional risk associated with changes in interest rates. 
These new risks, initially obscured by inflated house prices, have now become increasingly 
apparent now that prices are falling. The earlier growth and demand for subprime asset 
backed securities, often repacked into Collateral Debt Obligations (CDO), have faded away 
as liquidity dried up.   (Frankel 2006, Krinsman 2007)  
 
The availability of finance was, in these circumstances, no longer subject to monetary policy 
restrictions, rather prices and liquidity in national and international bond markets mattered. 
Mortgage backed securities were sold on to investors that had varying appetites for risk 
where sub-prime mortgage debt was blended with AAA rated mortgages and “wrapped” up 
for investors. Bundling and blending products with varying types of credit risk met with 
general “technical” approval because the process of diversification between high and low 
rates credit risk wrapped up into portfolios would both spread and limit risk.  
 
With sufficient controls and the necessary infrastructure in place, securitization offers 
several advantages over the traditional bank-lending model. These benefits, which 
may increase the soundness and efficiency of the credit extension process, can include 
a more efficient origination process, better risk diversification, and improved 
liquidity. 
 
 http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/assetsec.pdf 
 
Banking executives were encouraged to pass on ever more complex collateralized products to 
investors to value skim, improve banking returns and their own bonuses. Financial incentives 
focused attention on the construction of financial products that modified credit rating, risk, 
and financial return to the banks at the expense of liquidity. Liquidity depends on the 
continued repayment of interest and principal sums by households on their mortgages.  The 
increase in household mortgage charge offs and loan delinquency rates doubly exposes the 
financial sector because leveraged funding of mortgages coupled with mark to market 
accounting amplifies adjustments. Asset write-downs (holding losses) have severely damaged 
reported net income, market values and shareholder equity and now call into question the 
viability of the US banking sector business model. The complexity of the web of financial 
transactions surrounding the process of asset securitization makes it difficult to assess risk 
exposure from household payment default and counterparty risk with the result that banks are 
holding on to cash balances to protect liquidity even after Government bailout(s).    
 
 
3. Mortgage securitization: disintermediation, outsourcing and institutional risk 
 
We have noted how GDP growth and the value of mortgages outstanding for US households 
diverged during the period 1980 to 2007. This decoupling is on the one hand a reflection of 
inflated house prices combined with a growth in the outstanding stock of residential housing 
stock increasing household demand for mortgages. This break also coincided, as we have 
noted, with a change in US banking regulations and market demand. The US banking sector 
operated under a “retain and hold” policy up to the 1980s where customer deposits and their 
matching assets held on balance sheet. Growth in mortgage lending generally tracked the 
increase in investor deposits and thrift funds. The 1980s marked a break with the past because 
regulations now permitted banks to “repackage and sell on” assets held on balance sheet into 
a secondary market. This change in regulatory framework promoted substantial growth in 
mortgage-backed securities, that is, bonds whose cash flows are backed-up by household 
mortgage repayments. 
 
 Altunbas et al (2007) reveal that asset securitization both increased bank liquidity and served 
to transfer credit risk off balance sheet into the wider financial market. 
 
First, asset securitization increases banks’ liquidity while reducing banks’ 
funding needs in the event of monetary tightening. Second, securitization allows 
banks to swiftly transfer part of their credit risk to the markets (including institutional 
investors such as hedge funds, insurance companies and pension funds) thereby 
reducing their regulatory requirements on capital. (Altunbas et al, 2007: 6) 
 
In their paper for the European Central Bank Altunbas explore how securitization modifies 
the monetary transmission mechanism increasing liquidity (even if there is monetary 
tightening). In addition, they observe that:  
 
Securitisation activity has also strengthened the capacity of banks to supply new  
loans to households and firms for a given amount of funding. (Altunbas et al, 
2007:10) 
 
Securitization allows banks to remove and repackage assets that have built up on a bank’s 
balance sheet and sell these on in a secondary market. Credit risk is removed from the banks 
balance sheet and cash reserves increased as loans are sold on. In turn, the reduction in both 
credit risk and increased cash in hand on balance sheet provides banks with the regulatory 
ability to raise additional loans for new or existing customers. 
 
In the US from the post-war period up until the late 1970s investor deposits and diverted 
thrift savings had been the main source of funding for mortgage loans. The funding available 
for mortgages drifted upwards in line with the growth in national income and savings. 
However financing mortgages from checkable deposits and thrift savings was problematic 
because of the short-term volatility connected with this type of funding.  Using short-term 
deposits to finance long-term debt involved not only reconciling timing differences but there 
was the added uncertainty relating to the inflow of deposits against which new additional 
mortgages could be raised (see Chart 4). A secondary market would permit banks to sell 
mortgages they had originated to other investors to raise additional cash funding upon which 
they could increase the volume of mortgage lending. The advantage of asset securitisation is 
that it shifts the banking system from the principle of “retain and hold” to one of “repackage 
and sell on” to lever funds for lending. However, the process of securitisation can contribute 
to the greater retention by banks of “toxic waste”, that is “assets that are particularly illiquid 
and vulnerable to changes in macroeconomic performance” (Duffe 2007).   
Chart 4
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Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/ 
Note: Information taken from flow of funds accounts table F110: US chartered commercial banks 
 
Now that US banks could sell on loans to investors this transformed the role of financial 
intermediaries in the mortgage market from “buying and holding” to “buying and selling” 
(Keys et al 2008). Although securitization is concerned with transferring financial risk out 
from the banking system, banks were among the most active buyers of structured products 
and, as such, credit risk remained in the banking system (Duffe, 2007).  The increased 
distance between loan originators and the ultimate bearers of risk potentially reduced lenders 
incentives to carefully screen and monitor borrowers (Petersen et al 2002).  The increased 
complexity of financial products and markets also reduces investor’s ability to value them 
correctly.  This is especially valid for structured products were the value depends on the 
correlation structure of default events.   
 
The pooling and securitization of credits is the result of financial innovations and adoption of 
a new banking business model.  
“Credit is now something that is largely bought and sold on the market, rather than 
held for the long term on the balance sheet of financial intermediaries” (Draghi 2007) 
 In the US, the process of mortgage asset backed securitization developed earlier than in 
Europe. According to Geradi et al (2006), two regulatory adjustments facilitated the growth 
of securitization in the US. The first of these was a modified accounting regulation 
introduced by The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) in October 1981. According to 
Geradi this allowed lenders to sell mortgages on into a secondary market without the need to 
account for the losses attached to this transaction (citing Mason, 2004). The second related to 
the fact that Government Sponsored Enterprise’s (GSE’s) including Fannie Mae (Federal 
National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (The Federal Home Loan Bank Board) 
were exempt from state investor protection laws. Jacobides (2003) adds the insightful and 
additional dimension of “organizational unbundling” a concept employed to explain how 
latent financial gains from trade are released.  For example as between primary and 
secondary markets or between loan origination and managing capital risk such that “once the 
securitizers managed to find a way of creating marketable securities, finding willing 
institutions or investors only too happy to buy the loans without the hassle of producing them 
was easy”  (Follain and Zorn, 1990 cited in Jacobides, 2003: 23)  
The whole aspect of asset securitisation and collateralisation was favoured by banks. It first 
allowed banks to remove from their balance sheets more of the credit they themselves 
originated thereby earning income without tying up significant amounts of regulatory capital. 
Secondly, banks could obtain a relatively cheap wholesale funding by packaging up their 
mortgages and selling these off, while simultaneously raising further funds in the capital 
markets through issuing asset-backed securities where the assets that are physically backing 
the securities issued are the “packaged” mortgages themselves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: US securitization trends total and mortgage backed 
 
Trends in 
securitisation 
issuance 
Annual mortgage 
backed 
Total US 
household 
mortgages 
Securitized 
mortgages as a % 
of total household 
mortgages 
 $bn $bn $bn  
1990  377.6 2911.6 13.0 
1991  510.4 3075.1 16.6 
1992  850.6 3227.7 26.4 
1993  994.8 3384 29.4 
1994  571.5 3562.6 16.0 
1995  348.2 3736.1 9.3 
1996 661.0 507.8 3972.3 12.8 
1997 827.5 639.7 4218.9 15.2 
1998 1430.5 1166.3 4609.3 25.3 
1999 1312.5 1046.2 5076.5 20.6 
2000 1021.4 708.5 5533.7 12.8 
2001 2054.6 1672.1 6127.4 27.3 
2002 2718.4 2228.3 6924.6 32.2 
2003 3671.3 3071.0 7795.4 39.4 
2004 2648.8 1762.6 8891.3 19.8 
2005 3138.8 1966.4 10067.1 19.5 
2006 3240.9 1934.0 11192.9 17.3 
2007 2892.3 2027.0 11995.5 16.9 
Sources; Securitization data 
http://www.ifsl.org.uk/output/ReportItem.aspx?NewsID=25 
US outstanding household mortgages: Flow of Funds annual data 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm 
 
Throughout the 1990’s there was a steady growth in the rate of asset securitization and 
specifically mortgage backed securitization in the US.  For the period 1996 to 2007 mortgage 
backed securities account for three-quarters of the annual US securitization market. At its 
peak (2003) the share of US outstanding mortgages being securitized on an annual basis 
reached roughly 40 per cent before dropping off to levels below 20 per cent.   
 
The development of asset-backed securitization modifies the financial value chain.  The value 
chain for the purposes of this paper is the overall space that encompasses the physical 
business communications, logistical, financial, and administrative process, which resides 
between the buyer and seller as part of any commercial legal transaction. Securitization 
increased the demand for outsourcing especially to specialists who can provide technical and 
credit risk management (where banks cannot). The aim is to satisfy all parties: the bank, the 
depositors, the shareholders, and ultimately the regulatory authorities. This “technical 
cushion” providing a seemingly perceived transparent working order to the industry, but 
results in additional financial intermediation. The securitized product would then need to be 
re-priced to include for instance outsourcing fees, risk assessment internally, which may have 
to be further re-assessed and confirmed by external risk specialists. 
 
 
Source: Heilpern, 2008 
 
Securitized mortgages sold on into special purpose vehicles (SPV) or trusts further fragments 
the financial value chain and inflates intermediation. These additional intermediaries are 
value skimming and need to drive up volume because each individual transaction carries a 
slim margin out of which bonuses and commission fees are paid and financial surplus 
extracted. Fragmenting the value chain increases the number of financial intermediation 
nodes but this has implications for inter-bank risk management because product risk becomes 
less visible and liquidity spread increasingly thin across an expanded value chain.   
 
In the UK Northern Rock quite legitimately bundled up and then sold to a special trust some 
of its mortgages to raise additional funds upon which it could scale up its business. A special 
trust Granite, i.e. a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), acquired these mortgages, raising cash 
from issuing fixed interest bonds to pension funds and other investors within a complex 
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pyramid of transactions. Northern Rock’s income from household mortgage repayments 
transferred on to Granite, to service the interest paid to bond investors and other financial 
instruments issued.  
 
Depending on the so-called risk appetite of bond-investors, banks can “dice and slice” 
securitized assets into differentiated credit rating risk classes. The theory behind this is the 
principle of risk diversification, through blending high-risk sub-prime loans with lower risk 
mortgage debt. The purpose of dicing and slicing banks asset backed securities is to diversify 
the risk to banks and bond investors through this blending. The primary objective here is to 
modify the credit rating of the securitized product not underlying capital market liquidity. 
Where risk management played out at the expense of liquidity.  
However, although the initial motivation is to reduce risk and cost of capital the structuring of 
these transactions is located in a complex financial web where the visibility of payment 
information and risk assessment is less clear    
 
The complexity of these financial products and payments structure(s) conceals risk and 
reduces liquidity across the value chain. In circumstances where household mortgage default 
rates increase securitized products that have blended varying types of credit risk in a complex 
transactions network become “contaminated”. Contamination spreads across the banking 
sector, the wholesale markets, the retail markets, insurance companies, the asset management 
industry, and into the household.  The situation further deteriorates when holders of securities 
have trouble finding other investors to buy these as the secondary mortgage market runs short 
of liquidity. Those holding these asset backed securities, and who took out financing to do so, 
may have margin calls that force them to trade, at a discount, what are illiquid underlying 
investments. Liquidity is further restricted because financially distressed banks will hold on 
to cash as an insurance against further charge off’s of irrecoverable loans (net of recoveries).  
 
Following SFAS 157 “Fair value measurements” and more specifically SFAS 144 
“Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan” and SFAS 133 “Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities” charge off’s of irrecoverable loans and 
discounted asset backed securities should be made with reference to the loans carrying value 
and “estimated fair value” of collateral securing the loan.  Banks holding balances of 
securitized assets are required to re-value these assets to reflect their current market value in a 
distressed market. Holding losses charged off against net income have the potential to 
significantly reduce reported earnings per share, destabilise market valuation(s) and 
undermine capital adequacy ratios as shareholder equity held in the balance sheet is written 
down. 
 
4.  Drivers of the US credit crunch 
 
Basu (1993) argues that banking business model is fragile because the credit standard (in a 
liberal and competitive market) does not protect banks loan portfolio from risk of default.  
  
‘in the non-uniform competitive conditions under which the financial sector 
operates, it is not always possible in all circumstances for bankers or lenders to 
introduce a uniform credit standard in order to protect their entire loan capital 
portfolio.’ (Basu, 2003: 242) 
 
A credit standard is required, according to Basu, to ensure that banks are able to recoup funds 
from ‘the sale of collateral’ if borrowers default. In turn, this may act to put a brake on the 
“contagion” effect where is the possibility of a run on highly exposed banks. A “credit 
standard” might help to limit financial damage to the banking sector. However, the argument 
developed in this next section is that fair value reporting and modest increases in mortgage 
default rates can undermine the financial stability of banks. Spaventa observes that mark-to 
market accounting “inflates banks profits and the returns of the asset management industry, to 
the advantage of share prices and managers remuneration” (Spaventa 2008: 5).   
 
In the recent credit crunch accounting adjustments around fair value feed into a loss-making 
spiral where the mismatch between off-balance sheet maturity structures combines with 
valuation difficulties raising concern over counterparty risks and run-offs. Fair value 
accounting amplifies financial fluctuation(s) and restructuring response (s) over and above 
traditional historical cost accounting.  The reason for this behaviour is that mark-to-market 
accounting induces endogenous volatility into market transactions and thus reported 
profitability (Platin et al 2008, Bernard et al 1995) where the “fair value” portrays a situation 
remote from long-term fundamentals and contributes to illiquidity through its effects on 
banks balance sheets (Spaventa, 2008 ) 
 
 
Fair value accounting has implications for governance and management of the economy 
especially in the banking sector where asset valuations and provisions for loan losses are 
booked at market value. Fair value adjustments are volatile and can quickly undermine net 
income, market valuation and the equity cushion in bank balance sheets. A relatively small 
increase in household mortgage default rates has seriously weakened banking operating 
financials and their balance sheet structure Table 4 reveals the value of residential mortgages 
charged off against net income and the balance sheet in the US banking and thrift sector. 
Residential estate loans charged-off are loans (adjusted for recoveries) that have been 
removed off the books and charged against loss reserves. At the start of the 1990’s 0.21 per 
cent of residential loans were charged-off and after falling off the proportion of loans 
charged-off at the end of the decade and during a recession was still 0.17%. During 2007, the 
charge-off rate increased and by Q4 2008 had reached 1.58%. Estimates suggest the charge-
off rate could reach 2% by end Q1 2009 (see fig.2) as market conditions continue to 
deteriorate and interest rates for adjustable rate mortgages (ARM’s) increase putting more 
households into financial difficulty 
 
Table 4: Estimate of US residential mortgages charged off against banking net income  
 
Residential 
estate loans 
charged off 
Delinquency rate 
on real estate 
loans 
US Household 
Outstanding 
Mortgages 
Estimate of charged 
off loans 
 % % $ bill $ bill 
1991 0.21 7.4 2,790 6 
1995 0.13 3.09 3,461 4 
2000 0.13 1.84 5,129 7 
2005 0.08 1.34 9,379 8 
2006 0.08 1.36 10,452 8 
2007 Q1 0.14 1.77 10,652 16 
2007 Q2 0.19 2.02 10,862 21 
2007 Q3 0.28 2.39 11,016 29 
2007 Q4 0.45 2.88 11,158 50 
2008 Q1 0.82 3.52 11,226 95 
2008 Q2 1.13 4.33 11,300 132 
2008Q3 1.45 5.00 11,000 163 
2008 Q4 1.58 6.29 10,092 175 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/ 
Notes: Charge-offs are the value of loans and leases removed from the books and charged against loss reserves. 
Charge-off rates are annualized, net of recoveries. 2008Q3 (estimated). 
Delinquent loans and leases are those past due thirty days or more and still accruing interest as well as those in 
nonaccrual status. Data for residential estate loans charged off and delinquent is for the first quarter of each year  
 
 
Adding together real estate, commercial real estate and household credit card loans charged 
off total charge offs increase from $175bn to $330bn and equivalent to 28 percent of US 
banking sector equity. While the value of loans charged off and loans delinquent (past 30 
days due) would be equivalent to writing off all the equity employed in US banks as at the 
end of the year 2008 ($12 trillion)   
 
 
Figure 2:   
 
http://www.researchrecap.com/index.php/2008/08/22/charge-off-rate-for-us-banks-to-peak-in-mid-2009/ 
 
Although the charge off rate is small in percentage terms a one-percentage point increases 
translates into a significant charge off against banking net income. We estimate that actual 
charge-off’s against US banking sector net income will have increased from approximately 
$16 billion as at the first quarter 2007 to roughly $200 billion by the first  quarter 2009.  
 
Table 5: FDIC member loan net charge-off’s by type 
 
Year end Dec-08 Jun-08 Jun-07 Jun-06 Jun-05 Jun-04 
 $ bill $ bill $ bill $ bill $ bill $ bill 
Net charge off's 87.9 46.0 17.1 11.5 13.9 16.6
Real estate loans 38.5 22.5 2.9 1.1 1 1.2
Credit cards 19.5 10.3 7.4 6.1 8.4 8.9
Commercial and Industry  13.2 5.7 2.5 1.4 1.4 2.8
Other 16.3 7.5 4.3 2.9 3.1 3.7
http://www.fdic.gov/index.html 
 
 
 
The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures checkable deposits for 
member banks and saving/thrift institutions and publishes information on loan charge off’s 
(after recoveries) which are split into varying categories including: real estate loans, 
commercial and industrial loans and credit cards. In table 5 we summarise the position on net 
charge offs, from the FDIC, for the period year ending June 2004 to year ending December 
2008 (see table 5). 
 
Between June 2007 and December 2008 there is a substantial jump in the value of aggregate 
residential estate loan charge offs against FDIC member banks and savings institutions net 
income. Two-thirds of the increase in charge offs during this period resulted from the 
increase in irrecoverable real estate loans. Out of the total increase of $60bn sixty percent of 
this was due to real estate loans and the remainder $9 billion the increase in credit cards and 
commercial and industry loans and other loans losses. 
 
Table 6: FDIC member annual financials 2007 – 2008   
Income data mill $      2008      2007 
       Net interest income      357.7     352.7 
Provision for loan and lease losses     -174.3      -69.1 
Total non-interest income      207.6     233.0 
Total non-interest expense      358.7     367.0 
Securities Gains (losses)       -14.9       -1.4 
Income taxes         -6.7     -46.4 
Extraordinary gains          5.3        -1.7 
Net Income        16.0      99.9 
Cash Dividends       50.9    110.3 
Retained Income      -34.9     -10.3 
Return on Assets %       0.12      0.81 
Return on Equity %       1.24      7.75 
Source: http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2008dec/qbp.pdf 
Note: Return on assets and equity are annualised for the year ended June 2008 and June 2007 
Figures in columns will not add up as key financial data has been taken from the financial statement.  
 
The increase in residential loan charge offs has significantly undermined reported net income 
of FDIC members as they make increased provision for loan losses. 
 
Net income for all of 2008 was $16.1 billion, a decline of $83.9 billion (83.9 percent) 
from the $100 billion the industry earned in 2007. This is the lowest annual earnings 
total since 1990, when the industry earned $11.3 billion. 
 
http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2008dec/qbp.pdf 
 
In 2008 FDIC members charged $174 billion against profit compared to $69 billion in 2007 
reducing net income from $100 billion to $16 billion a drop of 84 percent. Chart 5 reveals the 
net income reported by a sample US banks with $10 trillion of assets under management. In 
Q1 2007, this group of banks reported a positive net income of $30bn and in Q3 2008 a net 
loss of £40bn driven by asset write down and goodwill impairments. For the same period, the 
market value of this group of banks fell from $1.3 trillion to £690bn a loss of 47%.  
 
 
Chart 5 Net income (losses) reported by US banks 2007 to 2008 
 
US Banks: Net Income Q1 2007 to Q3 2008 $bn
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Source: Edgar dataset (http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml) 8K’s and company web pages.  
 
Wachovia Corporation is the 4th largest bank holding company in the US with balance sheet 
assets totalling £800bn but exposure to mortgage charge off’s and provisions for credit losses 
has undermined reported net income, market valuation and balance sheet equity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 7: Wachovia loans, credit losses and net income Q3 2007 to Q3 2008  
 
Loans 
net 
Provision 
for credit 
losses 
Provisions 
as % of net 
loans 
US 
average 
Net income 
before goodwill 
impairment 
 $ bn $ bn  % % $ bn 
2007 Q3 449.2 0.4 0.09 0.23 2.6 
2007 Q4 461.9 1.5 0.32 0.42 0.1 
2008 Q1 480.4 2.8 0.58 0.69 -0.7 
2008 Q2 488.2 5.7 1.17 1.01 -4.8 
2008 Q3 482.3 6.6 1.37 1.5 -7.6 
Source: Edgar dataset, SEC Washington, 8K’s and company website 
http://www.wachovia.com/inside/page/0,,133_205_300,00.html 
 
 
 
For the period, Q3 2007 to Q3 2008, Wachovia reported increased provisions for credit loss 
rising from 0.09% to 1.37% of total loans and roughly in line with US banking sector 
averages. Although this is a small percentage of loans under management (1.37% of $482bn) 
this translates into a $6.6bn provision which is large when net revenues were just $6bn in Q3 
2008. Overall, this forced Wachovia into a net loss of $7.6 bn in Q3 2008 after covering all 
non-interest expenses.   
 
Significantly, a large proportion of actual and anticipated credit losses originated out of the 
Golden West Financial Corporation of Oakland, California which had been acquired by 
Wachovia for $25.5bn in 2006. Specifically Golden West specialized in “Pick a Payment” 
loans accounting for $119bn out of $482bn of mortgages issued on Wachovia’s balance sheet 
as at September 2008. “Pick a Payment” loans allowed the borrower to choose from four 
payment options: a minimum payment, interest only, a fully amortising 15-year payment and 
a fully amortising 30-year payment term. Of those taking out “Pick a Payment” loans 85% 
had applied using the “Quick Qualifier” programme where “As a result, loans in the ‘Quick 
Qualifier’ programme may have varying levels of income and asset verification” (Wachovia 
10Q, Oct 2008).     
 
 
“Substantially all of the Golden West mortgage portfolio has consisted of a product, referred 
to as “option ARMs” or adjustable rate mortgages with monthly payment options. The credit 
quality of this portfolio has deteriorated significantly in the current mortgage crisis” (Well 
Fargo S-4: 37) 
 
http://www.wachovia.com/file/Wells_Fargo-Wachovia_S-4(Filed).pdf 
 
 
At the end of September 2008 two-thirds of Wachovia’s “Pick a Payment” loans were in the 
form of the ‘minimum monthly payment’ and so those taking out these loans were building 
up ‘negative amortisation’ because the total amount owing increased as the outstanding loan 
included the unpaid interest on top of the original loan. Deferred interest on these loans 
amounted to $4.1bn as at the end of Q3 2008. During the period, Q3 2007 to Q3 2008, 
Wachovia increased provisions for credit losses from its “Pick a Payment” asset class. In a 
recent presentation (September 2008), Wachovia managers revealed that out of the $119bn of 
outstanding pick a payment mortgages they expected that a further $23bn or 22% of this class 
of mortgages would need to be charged off against income.  
http://www.wachovia.com/file/WB3Q08_Presentation.pdf 
 
Wachovia’s problems were concentrated in a mortgage asset class underwritten by thin 
documentation on the lenders finances and offered two thirds of these borrowers a minimum 
payment “credit card” style mortgage repayment plan.  On the downside, this class of 
mortgages resulted in a substantial write down in Wachovia’s net income and reported net 
income per share.     
 
Table 8: Wachovia market value Q3 2007 to Q3 2008 ($bn) 
 
 Market value $ bn Index  
2007 Q3 95.3 100.0 
2007 Q4 75.3 79.0 
2008 Q1 53.8 56.4 
2008 Q2 33.5 35.2 
2008 Q3 14.1 14.7 
Source: http://www.wachovia.com/inside/page/0,,133_205_300,00.html 
As net earnings per share (EPS) collapsed this also triggered a reduction in the price of 
Wachovia’s share price and aggregate market value which dropped from $95bn to $14bn (a 
loss of 85%) for the five quarters ended Q3 2008. This drop in market value triggered by the 
deteriorating performance of Golden West then forced a goodwill write down of $18.8bn.  
Goodwill impairment testing 
- As of September 30, 2008, resulted in $18.8 billion pre-tax impairment 
- $18.7 billion after-tax as only a small percentage of goodwill is tax deductible 
Drivers of impairment was declining market valuation and terms of the merger with 
Wells Fargo 
http://www.wachovia.com/file/WB3Q08_Presentation.pdf 
Goodwill impairments totalling $24.9bn accelerate the deterioration in Wachovia’s operating 
financials. Shareholder equity already thinned down by a programme of $20.5bn of share 
buy-backs (1990 to 2007) further eroded by the goodwill impairment charge lodged in the 
accounts in Q3 2008  
  
Table 9: Wachovia net loss after goodwill impairment 
 Income  
Net income pre 
goodwill impairment 
Goodwill 
impairment
Net income/ 
loss 
Total 
Equity 
 $bn $bn $bn $bn $bn 
2007 Q3 7.5 2.6  2.6 70.1 
2007 Q4 7.4 0.1  0.1 76.9 
2008 Q1 7.6 -0.7  -0.7 78.0 
2008 Q2 7.5 -4.8 6.1 -10.8 75.1 
2008 Q3 5.8 -7.6 18.8 -26.4 50.0 
 
Source: http://www.wachovia.com/inside/page/0,,133_205_300,00.html 
 
At the end of the period covered in table 9 the collapse of Wachovia’s financials and 
reduction of market value coincided with disclosures by the banks management revealing that 
liquidity was strained and the bank had limited unencumbered assets upon which it could 
raise further capital. Without a rescue deal, it would go into liquidation and holders of 
common stock “would likely receive no material value”.  
 
At the start of October 2008 Wells Fargo agreed to purchase Wachovia after hasty 
negotiations. Perella Weinberg provided opinions on the deal to Wachovia stockholders 
disclosed in the S-4 documentation provided on the merger to shareholders. 
 
“diligence of Wells Fargo was limited to publicly available information, including 
publicly available estimates of certain research analysts covering Wells Fargo, and did 
not include discussions with management or representatives of Wells Fargo or other 
diligence that it would customarily conduct in connection with preparing a fairness 
opinion” (S4:55) 
 
 
Moreover, in the rush Perella Weinberg sought advice and reassurance as to the quality of 
Well Fargo’s balance sheet from Wachovia management.  
 
“Perella Weinberg is not an expert in the valuation of loan or mortgage portfolios or 
securities relating to loan or mortgage portfolios, or allowances for losses with respect 
thereto, and accordingly, did not evaluate the same with respect to Wachovia or Wells 
Fargo, and assumed, with the consent of Wachovia’s board of directors, that Wells 
Fargo’s allowances for such losses were adequate to cover all such losses” (S4:55). 
 
(http://www.wachovia.com/file/Wells_Fargo-Wachovia_S-4(Filed).pdf) 
 
Wells Fargo S-4 documentation on the merger between the two companies reveals the cost of 
acquiring Wachovia to be $24.5bn, that is, the cost of acquiring the market value of 
outstanding share capital and preferred stock. The fair value of Wachovia’s assets  assessed at 
just $10bn. The book value of equity ($50bn) now reduced by a further $40bn in respect of 
anticipated future charge offs of non-performing loans.  
 
Table 10 Extract from Wells Fargo S-4 purchase cost of Wachovia $bn.   
  
 As at Sept 30th 2008 
Purchase price of shares 14.7 
Preferred stock acquired 9.8 
Purchase consideration 24.5 
Of which : Goodwill (14.5) 
Fair value of assets 10 
http://www.wachovia.com/file/Wells_Fargo-Wachovia_S-4(Filed).pdf 
Note: Wachovia equity value as at Sept 30th 2008 was $50bn and expected future loan losses 
$40bn 
 
   
In the nine months to Sept 2008 Wells Fargo had made allowances for loan losses equivalent 
to 1.9% of loans ($422bn) compared to Wachovia’s 3.2% (on $482bn). The balance sheet 
position of Wells Fargo may be somewhat more secure but volatility of capital conditions 
makes it less than certain that the amalgamation of these two banks will establish a bigger 
and more robust business.  
 
In the US, banking sector the net income margin(s) on assets employed is very slim averaging 
just 1% in 2007. A small increase in the number of households defaulting on their mortgages 
quickly translates into a large loss of earnings and increased market value at risk. Mark to 
market accounting (Andersson et al 2008) further amplifies financial adjustments, for 
example, triggering goodwill impairment(s) charged-off against net income and shareholder 
equity. Shareholder equity averaged just 8-10% of total banking sector assets in the US 
banking sector in 2007 after share buy-backs for treasury stock and executive bonus schemes 
had depleted this safety cushion in the balance sheet.  
 
 
Discussion and conclusions   
 
The drivers of the current crisis in US banking sector have their origin in the relaxation of 
regulatory conditions that decoupled the increase in stock of mortgages outstanding from 
bank deposits and GDP growth. The sheer scale of real estate mortgage debt outstanding, 
range of financial products available fuelled by incentives to drive up sales, margins and 
value skim increased the probability of higher default rates in a downturn. The technical 
arguments for mortgage securitization have centred on the advantages to banks focussing on 
the management of balance sheet risk, risk diversification and extending funds for lending 
beyond the limits set by deposit taking.  
 
It is clear that existing credit risk models were not seriously anticipating the possibility that 
household default rates would increase because the behaviour and lending practises of US 
banks inflated risk exposure. The development of “ALT A” and “Pick a Payment” mortgages 
coupled with thin documentation and assessment of household assets and quality of earnings 
established the precondition that default rates would increase when market conditions 
changed. The underlying risk attached to these loans concealed during a period when house 
prices were inflating, loan to asset values falling, and equity release mortgages on the 
increase. When economic conditions deteriorated household credit risk and sub-prime 
mortgage default rates came to the surface.  
 
Relative to the total value of US mortgages outstanding charge offs and default rates are low 
in percentage terms. However, small adverse movements do matter because the scale of 
mortgages outstanding, by value, is significant and banks operate with fragile financial 
operating ratios and a thin margin of safety. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) reports that the during the period 2002 to 2007 the average US bank reported net 
income to total assets of 1.23%. This means that if mortgage default rates do go above 1% of 
asset value this would force most banks into losses. Net earnings of FDIC reporting banks 
have collapsed as the level of charge offs exceeded 1% of mortgage assets in Q2 and Q3 
2008. As earnings per share collapsed this, in turn, impacts negatively on the market value of 
US banks and forces banks like Wachovia into defensive restructuring and charges for 
goodwill impairment.  
 
Goodwill impairment is often a significant “lumpy” charge against net income. Goodwill 
held on US bank balance sheets was equivalent to 5 years worth of net income and 45% of 
shareholder equity as at the end of the financial year 2007.  Credit losses and goodwill 
impairment(s) could reduce shareholder equity to the point where many banks are no longer a 
“going concern”. FDIC financial datasets on insured commercial banks reveal the cushion of 
shareholder equity to be just 10% of total assets employed. 
 
A number of drivers have contributed to the growth in household mortgages outstanding in 
the US. It was inevitable that as economic conditions deteriorated US households, aggravated 
by the lending practises of US banks, would default on loans. It is also clear that the financial 
architecture structuring the foundations of the US banking sector business model cannot 
sensibly resist the negative financial momentum arising from charge offs and goodwill 
impairment because the net income and equity to asset coverage ratios are thin and fragile. 
 
Accounting regulation(s) are ‘socially constructed’ often reflecting the variable claims of 
different stakeholders the dominance of which changes over time. In recent years the US 
Finance Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been concerned to reflect the interest of 
shareholder-investors in accounting standards with the result that the US banking and non-
financial corporate sector has been required to mark to market. Mark to market accounting 
reflects the market value of corporate-capital market transactions in the balance sheet on 
behalf of shareholders. In a world where capital markets are inflating holdings gains can be 
extracted from assets held on balance sheet and recycled into income and back into wealth 
accumulation. However, we also know that, if the future is like the past, product and capital 
markets will not continue to grow all of the time.  There are thus profound consequences for 
economic stability, financial risk assessment and asset valuation when the gains and losses 
from wealth accumulation are blended into current income statements when markets do turn 
down. The US Government has recently poured another $20bn into Bank of America and 
Citigroup and AIG reported net losses of £128bn as at the end of the financial year 2008. In 
the UK Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds banking group reported a net loss of $70bn and 
billions employed to soak up toxic irrecoverable loans.   It is now time to re-think the way in 
which we regulate the banking sector. The agenda for change should focus on limiting the 
risk to society that arises from an incentive driven wealth accumulating credit based system 
that is underwritten by a non viable banking business model. We could usefully start by 
removing incentives and the technical ability to inflate balance sheet assets ahead of GDP, 
net income and balance sheet shareholder funds.    
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